By 1989, narcotics trafficking in Colombia, Panama, the Caribbean, and the eastern Pacific has become a strategic crisis. The cartels are no longer merely smuggling cocaine; they are corrupting institutions, intimidating governments, exploiting coastal communities, moving money through international banks, and challenging state authority.
The Drug Interdiction Coalition exists to break this system.
Your room represents a coalition of American, Colombian, Panamanian, military, law-enforcement, intelligence, customs, diplomatic, and political actors. You do not all have the same priorities, but you face the same basic problem: the trafficking networks are moving faster than the governments trying to stop them.
The cartels are believed to be preparing multiple major shipments through Caribbean and Pacific routes. Intelligence suggests these movements may involve fishing vessels, cargo ships, remote transfer points, clandestine airstrips, corrupt officials, and protected financial channels. The precise routes are unknown. The timing is uncertain. The reliability of informants varies. Some institutions that claim to support interdiction may already be compromised.
The DIC’s mission is to disrupt the trafficking network, not merely seize one shipment. A successful operation may expose routes, identify cartel leadership, weaken financial networks, protect witnesses, and strengthen the political case for extradition. A failed operation may reveal sources, cause civilian casualties, violate sovereignty, embarrass governments, or trigger cartel retaliation.
This is not a conventional military campaign. It is an intelligence-driven interdiction crisis.
Colombia is under enormous pressure. Cartel violence has intensified, public confidence is fragile, and extradition remains one of the most explosive political issues in the country. Anti-cartel officials, judges, journalists, police officers, and political leaders face intimidation or assassination. The Colombian government needs results, but it cannot appear to be surrendering sovereignty to the United States.
Panama is even more complicated. The Panamanian Defense Forces control critical territory, infrastructure, ports, and airfields. Panama is also central to regional finance and movement. Any DIC operation connected to Panama risks colliding with the Noriega regime, corrupt security elements, opposition forces, and U.S. strategic interests beyond narcotics.
The United States has the resources to apply pressure, but not unlimited freedom of action. Coast Guard, Navy, Customs, DEA, CIA, embassy, and SOUTHCOM actors must coordinate across legal boundaries. A Coast Guard boarding, a DEA informant operation, a Colombian raid, a Customs seizure, and a military surveillance mission may all affect the same target, but they do not operate under the same authorities.
Your central challenge is coordination.
At the start of committee, DIC delegates are aware of the following:
Multiple narcotics shipments are expected to move soon.
At least one Caribbean maritime route is active.
At least one Pacific route is active.
Fishing vessels may be acting as scouts, decoys, couriers, or transfer platforms.
A larger cargo vessel may be involved in offshore pickup or onward shipment.
Some cartel combat groups may be positioned to protect movement corridors or retaliate against interdiction.
Panama is likely being used for transit, finance, concealment, or protection.
Colombian cartel factions may not be fully united.
Some local communities may possess useful intelligence but may not trust DIC forces.
Corruption is suspected in customs, port, police, military, or political institutions.
The DIC does not know which intelligence channels are secure.
No single delegate has the complete picture. Intelligence must be requested, compared, tested, and protected.
The DIC should seek to accomplish as many of the following as possible:
Identify active trafficking routes.
Interdict narcotics shipments before they leave the region.
Capture or expose logistical nodes, not just individual couriers.
Protect informants, witnesses, and cooperative local actors.
Preserve Colombian and Panamanian political legitimacy where possible.
Avoid unnecessary civilian casualties or unlawful escalation.
Identify cartel financial channels and corrupt officials.
Strengthen the legal and political case for prosecution or extradition.
Maintain coalition unity despite competing national and institutional priorities.
Prevent the cartels from using violence, misinformation, or corruption to regain initiative.
A pure tactical victory is not enough. Seizing one vessel while exposing an informant, alienating Colombia, or triggering a political disaster may still be a strategic failure.
The DIC is not a single unified machine.
The DEA wants evidence, informants, arrests, and cartel networks.
The Coast Guard wants clean maritime interdictions and lawful boardings.
The Navy and SOUTHCOM want operational security, regional stability, and clear authority.
Customs wants cargo intelligence, manifests, seizures, and ports of entry.
The CIA and intelligence liaisons want strategic visibility and source protection.
Colombian officials want sovereignty, legitimacy, and protection from cartel retaliation.
U.S. diplomats want cooperation without creating an international incident.
Panamanian opposition figures want pressure on narco-corruption but fear direct retaliation.
These interests overlap, but they are not identical.
Delegates must negotiate within their own side before they can defeat the opposing side.
Command: Modern Operations will represent the physical battlespace.
DIC decisions may affect:
Cutter patrol routes
Boarding operations
Helicopter searches
Maritime surveillance
Patrol aircraft tasking
Radar coverage
Intelligence cueing
Port inspections
Colombian coastal operations
Interception windows
Rules of engagement
Civilian vessel screening
Search-and-rescue or casualty response
Delegates should submit operational orders clearly. Poorly written orders may be delayed, misunderstood, or executed inefficiently.
Operational orders should identify:
Ordering authority
Asset requested
Mission
Search or patrol area
Target description
Timing
Communications posture
Boarding or interception authority
Rules if challenged
Abort conditions
Who is informed
The crisis staff will determine what is legal, possible, and executable.
The DIC cannot simply attack anything suspicious.
Delegates must consider:
Sovereignty of Colombia and Panama
Law of the sea
Boarding authority
Evidence standards
Diplomatic fallout
Civilian casualties
Misidentification of vessels
Corruption inside partner institutions
Media exposure
Retaliation against officials or civilians
Escalation with the Panamanian Defense Forces
Aggressive action may produce results, but reckless action may destroy the coalition’s legitimacy.
The committee begins with fragmentary reports from multiple agencies.
A suspected cartel logistics network appears to be preparing simultaneous maritime movement through both the Caribbean and Pacific. A cluster of fishing vessels has been observed operating outside normal patterns. A cargo vessel with unclear ownership may be preparing for an offshore transfer. Colombian sources report unusual activity near remote coastal areas. Separate financial intelligence suggests large sums of money have recently moved through Panamanian channels.
No one knows whether these signs point to one coordinated shipment, several smaller shipments, a cartel deception operation, or an attempt to bait DIC forces into exposing their methods.
The DIC must decide where to focus first.
Delegates are expected to act through:
Crisis notes
Joint directives
Intelligence requests
Operational orders
Diplomatic communications
Legal authorizations
Public statements
Backroom negotiations
The most successful delegates will not simply demand action. They will build coalitions, protect information, use CMO assets intelligently, and understand the political consequences of every operation.
You are not fighting a battle. You are trying to break a network.
The cartels win if they preserve routes, protect leadership, move product, corrupt institutions, and make the state look powerless.
The DIC wins if it exposes the network, disrupts shipments, preserves legitimacy, and forces the cartels into mistakes they cannot recover from.
Delegate List
Command Delegates
Adm Paul A. Yost Jr. — U.S. Coast Guard Interdiction Commander
Gen Maxwell R. Thurman – SOUTHCOM Commander
Col Richard Mercer — U.S. Airborne Surveillance Commander
Cpt Luis Eduardo Arango — Colombian Navy Coastal Commander
Col Andrés Restrepo Vélez — Colombian Air Force Interdiction Commander
Intelligence Delegates
John C. “Jack” Lawn — DEA Administrator
Joseph “Joe” Toft — DEA Bogotá Station Chief
Javier F. Peña — DEA Field Investigator, Colombia
Miguel Maza Márquez — Colombian DAS Director / Intelligence Chief
Carol Boyd Hallett — U.S. Customs Commissioner
Political / Diplomatic Delegates
Thomas E. McNamara — U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
Arthur H. Davis Jr. — U.S. Ambassador to Panama
Mónica de Greiff — Colombian Justice Ministry / Extradition Delegate
Virgilio Barco Vargas — Colombian Presidential Delegate / President’s Office
Guillermo Endara — Panamanian Opposition / Civilian Government Delegate
Ancillary Delegates
Ricardo Arias Calderón — Christian Democratic Leader
Guillermo “Billy” Ford — Panamanian opposition vice-presidential figure
César Gaviria — Colombian presidential candidate
María Jimena Duzán — Colombian investigative journalist covering cartel violence/corruption
Cardinal Mario Revollo Bravo — Archbishop of Bogotá / church legitimacy and mediation channel